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ABSTRACT
Mixed-use developments represent some of the most innovative and complex real estate
accomplishments of the last three decades. Though mixed-use developments are
commonly recognized for their dynamic architectural solutions, mixed-use developments
also exemplify very interesting challenges in terms of financial and legal structure. The
mix of uses on one site fosters a unique responsiveness to market conditions, which is
broadly categorized into four attributes: synergy, diversification, development risk and
physical flexibility. Each of these four pose useful questions about the strategic
enhancement of a property's long term viability in the market place.
In examining these issues through a series of three case studies, it becomes clear that the
mixed-use product has evolved significantly since its appearance in the market three
decades ago. Developers have worked to integrate architectural, financial and legal
strategies in order to achieve new innovations that otherwise might not have been
accepted by the lending community. These projects can serve as models to future
mixed-use developments and to the real estate industry in general.
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CHAPTER ONE
PURPOSE
The development of successful real estate properties is based on two fundamental,
interrelated capabilities: first, the developer must craft a real estate "product" which is
demanded by the marketplace. Second, the developer must procure the financing that
will bring that product into fruition. Production and financing cannot work
independently; the key is to address both aspects simultaneously to create a marriage
between innovation and viability.
Historically, real estate has suffered dramatic downturns in value because either one
factor or the other has been missing. In the mid 1980's, for instance, developers enjoyed
plentiful access to institutional funds yet continued to push real estate products that
had little or no demand in the market. In the early 1990's, developers saw room for
opportunity with undervalued properties, yet suffered from a dearth of capital.
While in theory the industry should focus equally on both product and finance,
published studies rarely attend to the delicate balance between these two elements. The
extent of industry thinking on this issue is that lending practices tend to suppress
product innovation. As stated in such an article in Urban Land "Financial institutions
have never been particularly adventuresome about lending on development projects
outside the mainstream. The hesitation of lenders to risk money on a still unproven
concept when plenty of more conventional development projects are vying for the same
limited funds is a decided obstacle to the implementation of developers' plans."1
Indeed, real estate is generally categorized by both practitioners and theorists into
distinct and homogeneous product types: residential, office, retail, industrial,
recreational and hotel. This makes real estate more easy to analyze and evaluate: data
can be gathered on comparable projects; economic trends can be predicted; and lenders
can pool alike assets to create securities. This homogeneity is beneficial to a certain
extent; it allows real estate to achieve liquidity through securitization, investor
credibility through time series analysis, and cost efficiency through loan standardization.
1 Lloyd W. Bookout, "Neotraditional Town Planning: Bucking Conventional Codes and
Standards," Urban Land April 1992, p. 24.
Ironically, the developer operates under a different philosophy, one which has been
labeled the "fallacy of uniqueness"2 . Many developers strive to create a building which
is impossible to substitute, which has the unique ability to withstand economic cycles,
and which is entirely customized to its local market. Given this dichotomy between
developer and financier, it is valuable to examine those projects which do not fall into
one of the industry-wide categories, particularly to examine projects which employ an
unusual level of innovation and creativity.
This thesis focuses on one of the most complex and unique products in real estate: the
urban mixed-use development (MXD)3 . The extraordinary complexity of mixed-use
developments serves as an excellent vehicle for understanding how design and finance
interact to create a product that can be both innovative and economically durable. In
many ways, mixed-use development has served as a testing ground for innovation in the
industry. Physically speaking, many MXDs are the boldest, most daring U.S. projects of
the last three decades; observing and understanding the strategic decisions that
supported those projects is crucial to understanding the past and future dynamics of
real estate.
This thesis presents combined analysis of the design and finance of mixed-use
development, an approach which has not been taken before. In an attempt to compare
theory with empirical evidence, three case studies are used to demonstrate the evolution
of mixed-use as a product and as an investment.
The structure of the thesis is as follows: Chapter Two outlines the essential
characteristics that, theoretically, differentiate mixed-use from single-use. Chapter
Three examines three urban mixed-use developments--Water Tower Place in
Chicago, IL, Copley Place in Boston, MA, and 900 North Michigan in Chicago, IL --
which were completed in 1976, 1984, and 1988 respectively. The cases are used to
demonstrate how the financing and design of these projects has evolved with the
industry over time and to what extent theory meets with empirical evidence. Chapter
Four addresses the changes that have occurred in the marketplace since the real estate
2 William C. Wheaton, Chairman, MIT Center for Real Estate, Fall 1994.
3 The definition of a mixed-use development, as provided by the Urban Land Institute in 1976,
is a project containing three or more self-sustaining, revenue-producing uses, which is integrated
both physically and functionally, and which is developed in accordance with a coherent plan.
Dean Schwanke, Mixed-Use Development Handbook (Washington: Urban Land Institute, 1987)
crash of the late 1980s, and, using informal project examples, discusses how mixed-use
development might be developed and financed in the future.
CHAPTER TWO
THE INNOVATION OF THE MIXED-USE PRODUCT
To understand modern mixed-use development in its proper context, it is beneficial to
return to medieval towns and cities, where, according to architect and author Eberhard
Zeidler, describing buildings as mixed-use would have seemed irrelevant.4 For centuries,
buildings contained all aspects of daily life, both work and residence, and even in some
cases, religious or civic functions.
This pattern of urban living did not change significantly until the Industrial Revolution,
when noise, pollution and overcrowding first encroached upon European and American
cities. At that time, urban planners and authors known as the Utopiasts, led chiefly by
Ebenezer Howard, began to construct ideas of a more healthy, moral and leisurely life
away from the city. According to Jane Jacobs, famed author of The Death and Life of
Great American Cities, "Howard set spinning powerful and city-destroying ideas: he
conceived that the way to deal with the city's functions was to sort and sift out of the
whole certain simple uses, and to arrange each of these in relative self-containment."5
Howard's ideas took hold, and patterns of development changed dramatically in the
next century. In the U.S., two major influences--the rise of the automobile and the
establishment of local zoning regulations--reinforced and made permanent the trend
away from mixed-use environments. Not until the 1960s, in response to the auto-
oriented, dispersed nature of American communities, and to the banal single-use
developments of the 1950s, did mixed-use development return, as a way to revitalize
commercial business districts.
Though the physical aspects of mixed-use development date back to medieval city life,
the legal and financial precursor to the MXD was in many ways the retail mall. In 1931,
Highland Park opened in Dallas, and was the first planned shopping center to be
located on a single parcel of land under the ownership of a single entity. In 1950, the
Northgate Center opened in Seattle, the first regional mall in the nation, with a
4 Zeidler uses the term "multi-use" instead of "mixed-use". Eberhard H. Zeidler, Multi-Use
Architecture in the Urban Context (Stuttgart: Karl Kramer Verlag, 1983), p. 11.
5 Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage Books, 1961),
p. 18.
department store as anchor and an outdoor pedestrian mall. In the ensuing years, retail
developers initiated many of the operational standards which are common today:
percentage leases, merchants' associations, tenant mix policies, joint promotions, and
common area maintenance.6
The first mixed-use developments utilized the same concept as the retail mall, yet
included other uses besides retail. The key was to offer the users of each component a
distinct advantage (convenience) while increasing the vitality (synergy between users)
and visibility (indirect public relations) of the project. Mixed-use developers also
looked to retail projects for clues on operations and maintenance. To resolve
complications that arose between the various components, mixed-use developers
utilized the tool that had been created by mall developers: the reciprocal easement
agreement (REA), which laid out the various rights of each component in relation to
physical access and building systems.
In the 1960s, a number of large mixed-use developments were initiated by city
governments or planning agencies: Penn Center in Philadelphia, Constitution Plaza in
Hartford, and Charles Center in Baltimore. In 1970, Gerald Hines, founder of Hines
Interests Limited Partnership, opened the Houston Galleria, which became a nationally
recognized example of the new mixed-use product. Unlike many of its predecessors, the
Galleria was not initiated by a public entity, but was developed as a private sector
venture. As reported by Bernard Frieden and Lynne Sagalyn in Downtown Inc. "In
building the Galleria, Hines said he was trying to define a new prototype, 'a whole new
urban form that the American public doesn't know exists'... .Hines broke almost all the
rules of mall building: retail shops were stacked on three levels, and high-rise hotel
lobbies and office buildings fed directly into the mall."7
During the 1970s, developers and city governments built approximately 150 mixed-use
and multi-use developments around the country, and during the 1980s, the number of
MXDs nearly tripled to 400.8 In 1985, Richard Witherspoon, an economic and financial
consultant and a lead author of Mixed-Use Development: New Ways of Land Use,
6 A. Alexander Bil and Nicholas Ordway, "Shopping Center Innovations-The Past 50 Years,"
Urban Land June 1987, pp. 22-25.
7 Bernard J. Frieden and Lynne B. Sagalyn, Downtown, Inc. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989),
p. 73.O Based on a ULI survey of 409 projects. "Mixed-Use/Multi-Use," Urban Land, March 1989,
pp. 54-56.
called mixed-use development "the single most important new movement in real estate
development in 25 years", and emphasized that the birth of mixed-use was comparable
to the advent of the shopping center in the years following World War II.9
ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
With mixed-use developments in existence for over 30 years, it is useful to look
critically at the advantages and disadvantages of mixed-use development. Following is
an outline of the major differentiating attributes of MXDs, focusing specifically on the
reasons why in theory mixed-use development might perform differently than single-
use. These theories will then be used as a backdrop to the case studies in Chapter
Three.
Synergy
Synergy is the hallmark of the mixed-use development. By definition, a mixed-use
development creates a dynamic atmosphere that cannot be produced by any one
component individually. By linking various uses in one continuous setting, the MXD
intentionally imitates the vivacity of city streets, essentially creating a city within a
building. There is little dispute within the industry that a successful mixed-use
development creates that vibrant, yet safe and comfortable, atmosphere. The key
question is, however, whether that atmosphere--that synergy--translates into increased
value for the project.
From an urban economic standpoint, Ehud Mouchly and Richard Peiser hypothesize
that synergy does increase the intrinsic value of the development. "In the ideal model of
the MPC/MXD [master-planned communities and mixed-use developments], users,
perceiving the 'good value' it offers, will pay higher occupancy costs than those that
prevail elsewhere for similar uses, causing land use values inside the MPC/MXD to rise
faster and remain higher than values for identical land uses outside the project."1 0
Mouchly and Peiser note that generally, the value of a mixed-use development rises more
slowly during predevelopment due to the level of complexity, yet rises faster once
9 Robert Witherspoon, "The Second Generation of Mixed-Use Developments," Urban Land May
1985, pp. 2-6.
10 Ehud G. Mouchly and Richard B. Peiser, "Value for Everyone," Urban Land August 1993,
p. 17.
project entitlements have been obtained, and remains relatively higher throughout the life
of the project.
Conceptually, this theory seems to make sense. Office tenants might theoretically pay
higher rents because of the additional amenities available to them within walking
distance: retail shops, catering and audio/visual equipment from the hotel, or the use of
an on-site sports club. Hotels might command higher rates because their guests enjoy
on-site "entertainment" with the mall and site amenities. Retail tenants might generate
higher percentage rents, because sales are theoretically boosted by residential, office and
hotel users. Parking revenues might exceed those of single-use garages because parking
spaces are utilized 24 hours a day.
However, industry opinions and observations indicate that synergy is not perceived as
having a direct effect on the economic value of the property. Though there are
exceptions, amenities and atmosphere do not necessarily produce above-market rents.
Most of the lenders interviewed for this thesis emphasized that in looking at a mixed-
use development, each component is viewed as a freestanding asset. Some lenders
mentioned that for new MXDs, potential synergy does play a minor factor in rent
projections, particularly for parking or retail. However, for the most part, synergy is not
considered a measurable economic factor.
On the other hand, synergy is viewed as having a positive effect on factors of long term
viability, such as occupancy levels, leasing momentum, and tenant retention. MXDs are
generally high-profile projects and thus might attract a wider range of potential tenants,
even when competing against newer buildings. Tenants who do choose to rent space in
an MXD might value the image and the additional amenities, and therefore might be
inclined to renew leases. One developer noted a very dynamic relationship between the
various uses, describing strong positive feedback from tenants in MXDs. This developer
explained that office tenants, for example, can attract a higher caliber of employee
because of the added attraction of retail and other project amenities. Furthermore, the
hotels boost their occupancy levels on weekends by advertising special hotel packages in
coordination with sports events and retail promotions. Other developers expressed the
belief that mixed-use developments appreciate very well over the long term, and tend to
command lower cap rates.
While synergy can benefit a project in many ways, it can also backfire. If one component
of a project fails to attract users, it can hypothetically deter consumers from frequenting
the other uses. This "domino effect" theory is the chief reason that developers are intent
on determining that each use within the MXD is economically independent. Furthermore,
a project that has the proper legal structure can alleviate the effects of this phenomenon.
There are other complications with buildings that combine various uses in a high-density
setting. If managed poorly, tenants can suffer from negative externalities created by the
other components: noise, odor, or security problems. One might expect that MXDs have
unique challenges in operations, allocation of costs, and/or shared building services.
These unappealing features are not only of concern to tenants, but to financing sources,
and one might theorize that financing sources are more expensive for a mixed-use
development because of the added risk and/or legal complexity assumed by both
developer and lender.
Each of the developers and lenders interviewed cited examples of potential MXD
problems. One developer pointed to the fact that with more than one management team
on site, operational decisions can create conflict between the various uses. Changes that
benefit one use may not necessarily benefit another. Various lenders emphasized the
thorny issues that arise between project components: shared use of the loading dock,
access to cooling towers, and building expense allocation. Some suggested that the
added level of administrative and legal risk is priced into the cost of capital.
Diversification
Given that different land uses have different markets and different rental dynamics, a
mixed-use project enjoys financial diversification by combining more than one use.
Theoretically, a mixed-use project should experience lower volatility of net operating
income than a single-use project. In this sense, the mixed-use development is structured
similarly to a diversified portfolio of securities; it pools various income-generating
sources, reduces the volatility of cash flows, and thus diversifies away part of the
investment risk.
Take for example a city in which office rents are falling while retail rents are rising. In
that city, retail projects (single-use) will experience increased cash flow as leases roll
over; office projects will suffer decreasing rents; and mixed-use projects will stay the
most stable of the three.
Of course, diversification only exists if the rents of the various component move
differently. The financial performance of various product types has been studied in a
number of academic publications, chiefly a study by Hartzell, Hekman and Miles
(1986).11 Using data from 1973 to 1983 provided by a large institutional manager of
Industrial Office Retail Residential Hotel
Industrial 1.0
Office 0.3241 1.0
(0.1632)
Retail 0.4667 0.1790 1.0
(.0381) (.4502)
Residential 0.0223 0.0613 0.3404 1.0
(.9256) (.7974) (.1420)
Hotel 0.0878 0.3390 0.4575 0.0397 1.0
(.7130) (.1437) (.0426) (.8681)
Inflation 0.4578 0.7152 0.4771 0.4133 0.5329
(.0424) (.0004) (.0334) (.0701) (.0155)
The number in parenthesis is the probability that the true correlation
coefficient is greater than (R) under the null hyposthesis of R=0.
pension fund real estate investments, the study calculated the correlation between
various product types. The study found that these correlation coefficients were indeed
quite low (below 0.5); in other words, product types were found to move somewhat
independently over time. 12
In addition, data from the Russell-NCREIF Index of Property Values demonstrates that
property types do indeed perform quite independently over time. The following graph
11 David Hartzell, John Hekman and Mike Miles, "Diversification Categories in Investment
Real Estate," Journal of the American Real Estate & Urban Economics Association Spring 1986,
p. 242.The data included in this study was collected from a national sampling of projects. Although
the study did not calculate correlation coefficients within local markets, one would expect that
the correlation between product types is comparably low.
illustrates the difference between office and retail performance over a 15 year time
span. 13
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Adapted from "Insights on the Effect of Land Use Choice: The
Underlying Assets." See footnote for full reference.
Perpetual Option on the Best of Two
If mixed-use developments do offer lower volatility of cash flows, then the probability
of default occurring is theoretically lower. In that case, financing should be less
expensive. In support of this theory, Paul Childs, Timothy Riddiough, and Alexander
Triantis found in a contingent-claims pricing model that if a single-use project has a
default risk premium of 175 basis points, a mixed-use project has a default risk
premium which is 10 to 100 basis points lower, depending on the mix of uses and their
respective correlation coefficients. 14
13 David Geltner, Timothy Riddiough and Srdjan Stojanovic, "Insights on the Effect of Land
Use Choice: The Perpetual Option on the Best of Two Underlying Assets," Forthcoming, Tournal
of Urban Economics 1995, Figure 1.
14 Paul D. Childs, Timothy J. Riddiough, and Alexander J. Triantis, "Mixed-Uses and the
Redevelopment Option: Property and Mortgage Valuation Under Uncertainty," Unpublished
Manuscript, MIT Center for Real Estate and University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1994, p. 21.
The following exhibit, a cash flow statement for a fictitious mixed-use development,
demonstrates how an MXD can experience lower volatility of revenue. Although the
component rents are very volatile from year to year, total revenues are quite stable. Due
to the diversification effect, the standard deviation of total revenue is far lower than any
single component. Though the volatility of rents has been exaggerated to illustrate the
point, the concept can be applied to any mixed-use development.
Theoretical Cash Flow for a Mixed-Use Development
The Effect of Varying Component Rents on Total Revenue
Project Profile
Component Size Term of Lease
Office 450,000 sf annual
Retail 300,000 sf annual
Hotel 500 rooms nightly
Parking 750 spaces daily
Average Rent by Component
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Office (per sf) $25 $27 $30 $32 $23 $24
Retail (per sf) $40 $39 $52 $42 $35 $34
Hotel (per room) $175 $170 $150 $155 $200 $180
Parking (per space) $10 $9 $4 $7 $5 $12
Average Annual Revenue by Component (in thousands)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Office $11,250 $12,150 $13,365 $14,434 $10,350 $10,868
Retail $12,000 $11,640 $15,714 $12,571 $10,500 $10,185
Hotel $31,938 $31,025 $27,375 $28,288 $36,500 $32,850
Parking $2,738 $2,464 $1,095 $1,916 $1,369 $3,285
Total Revenue $57,925 $57,279 $57,549 $57,209 $58,719 $57188
Standard Deviation by Component
Office 1,572
Retail 1,987
Hotel 3,298
Parking 838
Total Revenue 596
Generally, it is observed that lease structure in a mixed-use project is also diversified.
For example, office leases vary considerably from hotel rates. Office buildings are
comprised of relatively long-life leases (5 to 15 year terms), and therefore react slowly to
fluctuations in market rent, while hotel rates are completely fluid and can change day to
day. Thus, a mixed-use project falls somewhere in the middle. In an environment where
office rates are rising and hotel rates are sinking, the single-use office building slowly
experiences increased cash flow as leases roll over, the hotel experiences an immediate
down-tick in revenue, yet the mixed-use development experiences both a long-term
increase in office rents and a short-term decrease in hotel revenue.
Thus far, diversification has been discussed in regards to reducing risk. It can also be
theorized, from an economic standpoint, that diversification enhances return. For
example, a one million square foot, single-use office building might experience declining
marginal rents, as the market absorbs the most appealing spaces first, and the balance
of the project is leased more slowly at lower rates. By contrast, a one million square
foot mixed-use development only provides one quarter of the office space, and therefore
can theoretically demand higher average rent per square foot. Therefore, for sites where
a single use cannot be absorbed at high density, mixed-use development is the optimal
solution. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, this is very commonly the underlying
economic force behind mixed-use projects.
The diversified nature of MXDs also might afford more flexibility in the design process,
and might allow projects to move beyond typical design conventions. In a single-use
project, lenders might refuse to fund a new design innovation, (for example a single
anchor in a retail mall), for fear that the project will not be economically sustainable. In
a mixed-use, however, the other components within the MXD might compensate for the
riskiness of the innovation (thus one anchor would be funded). In this sense, one might
deduce that because of diversification, the mixed-use product creates a more flexible
framework for development. Indeed, a number of developers and lenders cited
examples where the diversification effect did allow certain risky uses to be financed.
Development Risks
It is commonly believed that construction risk on a mixed-use project is greater than on a
single-use development. The increased complexity of mixed-use--sheer size and density
of the project, technical difficulty of sites with unusual infrastructure challenges, and
varying floorplates--increases the chance of budget and cost overruns. Increased
probability of complications might make a developer's profit margin more risky, or,
worse yet, jeopardize permanent lending commitments or lease arrangements.
One might also anticipate problems in amassing the resources needed in predevelopment
stages. Large parcels of land usually must be purchased and held for the duration of
approvals. The developer must rely on a design and construction team that has diverse
enough experience to handle various uses, or the developer must coordinate between
more than one designer or contractor. The approvals process can take a much greater
time than a single-use project, and often a developer cannot receive its lending
commitment until all permits are secured.
Finally, the developer must finesse the lending process, and particularly in the case of
more than one lender, must untangle the knot of conflicting interests that arise on a
mixed-use site. A longer development period makes it more difficult for the developer
to secure a forward takeout commitment. The operations documents--the reciprocal
easement agreement, the condo association agreement, and hotel operations agreement--
must guide project operations, and must explicitly resolve in advance any disagreements
that might arise between the components. For this reason, many developers prefer to
seek financing from a single lending source.
Absorption is the final development risk before a project moves into operations. With a
mixed-use development, the likelihood that three or four uses will be absorbed
simultaneously by the market is much more difficult to predict. Though some assume
that timing is an added risk for MXDs, others claim that MXDs actually lease faster
than single-use projects, because the momentum created by one component (particularly
retail) fosters quicker absorption of the others. In any case, the developer needs an
experienced team of leasing professionals who fully understand the local market for
each different component of the MXD.
Physical Flexibility and the Conversion Option
The fact that mixed-use development is made up of a "kit of parts" means that owners
theoretically have more flexibility to convert one use to another. Given shifts in the
market, a project owner could, for example, convert hotel floors to office floors for an
interested tenant. Also, given the fact that many mixed-use developments (particularly
suburban) enjoy more open space than single-use, the potential for expansion is arguably
more feasible than in a single-use project.
Though these changes involve significant monetary and time costs, they give mixed-use
owners more flexibility to adapt to a changing market. As argued by Childs, Riddiough
and Triantis, the redevelopment option enhances the project's economic value, because it
means that development is no longer an irreversible action. Their contingent-claims
pricing model demonstrates that if redevelopment costs are kept relatively low, the
"flexibility with respect to mixing uses and redevelopment will contribute significantly to
the overall value of the built property or undeveloped land."15 Furthermore, since
many mixed-use developments are built in phases, there is more flexibility for the owner
to make slight modifications during the development process which more truly reflect
market trends.
Other authors agree and point out the crucial importance of the planning phase.
Mouchly and Peiser explain that given the longevity of mixed-use projects, "the
MPC/MXD will not only go through several economic cycles, but also through several
structural changes in market needs, tastes, and preferences. Superior planning and
design, along with permitting for maximum flexibility, are needed to assure the survival
and competitive edge of the project."16 Furthermore, the developer must ensure that
legal documents, such as the reciprocal easement agreement or the legal subdivision, do
not prevent such conversion or expansion.
The four issues described above--synergy, diversification, development risk, and
physical flexibility--create the theoretical framework behind the advantages of
disadvantages of mixed-use development. It is useful to compare this framework with
real data, gathered from projects which are competitive in today's marketplace. Once
this is done, it is possible to draw conclusions about the performance of mixed-use
development as a unique real estate product.
15 Paul D. Childs, Timothy J. Riddiough, and Alexander J. Triantis, "Mixed-Uses and the
Redevelopment Option," Forthcoming 1995, Real Estate Economics, pp. 1-23.
16 Mouchly and Peiser, p. 18.
CHAPTER THREE: CASE STUDIES
Numerical data on mixed-use projects are not readily available as they are with single-
use products. Statisticians typically deal with mixed-use projects in one of two ways:
either a mixed-use project is categorized under "Other property type", in which case it is
lumped in with a wide variety of products, or a mixed-use project is split into its
separate components (office, retail, parking, etc.).
Given the lack of available information, the case study method is used in this thesis to
gain a better understanding of the interaction between production and financing
decisions in mixed-use development. Although the case study method does not
necessarily allow conclusions of statistical significance, there are valuable lessons which
can be drawn from the data, particularly in relation to the theoretical framework in
Chapter Two.
Furthermore, the case study method is suitable for looking at mixed-use developments
over time which can be valuable to understanding the evolution of both production and
financing. Many econometricians and real estate analysts recognize that there are two
ways to understand the behavior of real estate assets. The first is to look at a large
sample of properties at one moment in time. However, this approach is potentially
biased by the time in which the study occurs. The longitudinal approach is to study a
small number of loans and to trace the evolution of each deal, observing how different
structures and cash flow priorities change through the course of different economic
cycles and through the maturity of the project.
This thesis takes the longitudinal approach. Three case studies have been chosen: Water
Tower Place, Copley Place and 900 North Michigan. Each project is observed from the
time of inception to the present. Both Water Tower Place and Copley Place were
developed by Urban Investment and Development Company, (UIDC), which was
founded in 1968 as a subsidiary of Aetna Insurance. In 1984, JMB Realty Corporation
acquired UIDC, and assumed its ownership share in Water Tower Place and Copley
Place. JMB also purchased the design and approval rights for 900 North Michigan, and
subsequently developed 900 North from 1985 to 1988.
Although information was gathered from over ten different mixed-use developments,
these three projects serve as the focal point of this thesis. These three were chosen as
case studies for the following reasons: 1) they have similar design profiles: urban,
downtown sites in large U.S. cities 2) each was developed in a distinctly unique time
period: mid 1970s, early 1980s and late 1980s, respectively, which sheds light on the use
of evolving financial strategies and 3) though each project has different architects,
contractors, and lenders, the developer/owner is consistent over time, which allows
consistency in data collection. 17
17 It should be noted that the consistency provided by using data from one developer outweighs
the potential disadvantage of single-source bias.
WATER TOWER PLACE, CHICAGO, IL.
Opened in 1976
Water Tower Place was originally conceived in the early 1970s when Marshall Fields
approached UIDC in hopes of building a second department store in downtown
Chicago. Phil Klutznick, president of UIDC at the time, envisioned a project that would
not only fulfill Marshall Fields' requirements but would create an upscale, urban
destination. In light of exorbitant land costs along Michigan Avenue, he saw the
opportunity to do a project of very high density, namely a mixed-use project. UIDC
formed a 50/50 partnership with Marshall Fields and began the land assembly and
project design.1 8
At the time that UIDC was formulating its initial assumptions about the development,
there were still few precedents in the country for large scale mixed-use. The design--a
3.1 million square foot complex including multi-level retail, a high-end hotel, 40 floors of
condominiums, unconventional office space, and underground parking, all on one city
block--was highly unusual to private lending sources. Interestingly, by the time Water
Tower was complete in 1976, approximately 100 mixed-use developments had been
started throughout the U.S. 1 9 However, Water Tower Place was still colossal in
comparison; the average mixed-use development in the 1970s was 1.7 million in size in
comparison to Water Tower's 3.1 million square feet.20
Given Marshall Fields' initial involvement, the retail was the core component of the
project; all other uses were chosen to maximize synergy with the retail. According to
Norman Elkin, former vice president at UIDC, the intent was to gather various uses in
one dynamic place and maximize the possibility that people would come to Water
Tower for one particular reason and "make a day of it." In addition, each use was
specifically crafted to create a consistency of style throughout the building: Water Tower
was to be regarded as a safe, highly upscale destination in the city. Motivated by these
criteria, UIDC went about attracting the other project uses.
18 Unless otherwise noted, information on Water Tower Place was gathered from employees of
JMB and UIDC (see interview list).
19 Richard Witherspoon, "The Second Generation of Mixed-Use Developments," Urban Land,
May 1985, pp. 2-6.
20 Dean Schwanke, Eric Smart, and Helen J. Kessler, "Looking at MXDs," Urban Land
December 1986, pp. 20-27.
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UIDC obtained a commitment from the Ritz Carlton to open what was at the time only
their second location in the U.S., which would give Water Tower a unique flair. After
considerable market research, it was determined that the project would include roughly
200,000 square feet of office space. One floor of the office component was targeted
towards "destination office"--hair salons, dentists, optometrists, and custom furriers--
who desired the Michigan Avenue address but not a streetfront location. The other
office floor was leased by UIDC as its corporate headquarters. The high-end condos
were targeted towards wealthy residents of Chicago who sought a downtown residential
location with views of Lake Michigan. Retail shops were selected to supplement the
upscale merchandise offerings of the anchor tenants, Marshall Fields and Lord & Taylor.
In designing the structure, UIDC attempted to weave a number of urban uses into one
integrated space.
Project Statistics
Project Water Tower Place
Location Chicago, IL
Year Completed 1976
Project Cost $175 million
Project Size 3.1 million sf
# Stories 74
Components:
Office 200,000 sf
Retail 725,000 sf
Parking 640 spaces
Hotel 432 rooms
Residential 260 units
Amenities health club, theater
Just as UIDC thought of the project as a single architectural entity, the developer also
treated Water Tower as one seamless financial deal. The developer negotiated a
permanent loan commitment from Aetna Insurance for the entire development in 1971-
72.21 The $100 million loan was, at the time, one of Aetna's largest real estate
21 Note that the condos were not financed by the permanent loan but were financed by the
construction loan and equity. As each unit was sold, the proceeds paid down the construction
loan.
commitments. 22 Subsequently, construction financing for the entire project was issued
by First Chicago. The equity, which amounted to $40 million, was split evenly by UIDC
and Marshall Fields, as joint venture partners. The loan to value ratio, 71%, was not
uncommon at the time.
Though the real estate product was new, its financial structure was in no way unusual.
In the early 1970s, as in prior decades, the relationship between borrower and lender
was relatively simple. Deals were based primarily on established relationships between
companies. Indeed, UIDC enjoyed very high credit ratings with lenders, chiefly because
in the past it had always built for the long-term, retaining ownership for extended
periods, and building significant equity in its projects. The fact that UIDC was a
subsidiary to Aetna was also highly significant.
The economy in 1971-72 was generally stable, and lenders had not yet experienced
significant exposure to interest rate fluctuation or inflation. Therefore, loan rates could
be committed well in advance, and Water Tower Place, despite its potential risks,
enjoyed this advantage. Aetna/MetLife committed to the permanent loan rate
(8-5/8%) more than three years prior to occupancy of the building. The loan had a
fifteen year term, and was non-recourse.
The fact that UIDC financed the project with a single loan meant that the mixed-use
development was in effect cross-collateralized. Even though the project had different
use components, its risk was lumped into one "all or nothing" package. For example, if
the hotel had failed, and UIDC had been unable to meet its periodic debt service,
Aetna/MetLife would have had the right to foreclose on the whole project, even if the
other components had been healthy.
Each of the four key characteristics of mixed-use development addressed in Chapter
Two--synergy, diversification, development risk and flexibility--played a role in the
maturation of Water Tower Place. In many cases, these issues illustrate the degree to
which the design and the financing of the project were integrated.
22 Due to the size of the loan, Aetna split the debt 50/50 with Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company. For administrative purposes, the financing was considered a single loan.
Synergy
As discussed above, the project development team worked very hard to create a
synergistic atmosphere at Water Tower Place. Indeed, certain innovations which had
little precedent were used to achieve this synergy. First, Water Tower was the only the
second project in the country (after the Houston Galleria) to employ multi-level retail.
This was considered highly risky at the time, as retail had traditionally been thought to
only work at street level. Second, Water Tower was established around its retail
component, whereas, according to the ULI, the majority of 1970s mixed-use
developments were centered around office development. Third, the idea of crafting the
office space around special destination uses was quite unprecedented. Fourth, Water
Tower included an indoor "theater in the round" amphitheater, an amenity which was
unique at the time.
The degree to which UIDC worked to provide this synergy is in some ways a reflection
of the project's financial structure. Since Water Tower was financed by a single loan,
and in effect cross-collateralized as well, it follows that the borrower would want to
maximize the synergy in the project. To achieve that synergy, the developer crafted the
new real estate product with new, untested design ideas. The lender, on the other hand,
could keep the developer in check by cross-collateralizing the project.
As mentioned earlier, UIDC had the flexibility to break with precedent for another
reason: its outstanding credit relationship with lending sources. Lenders were aware
that the developer fully intended to keep ownership of Water Tower Place for a long
time, and that UIDC's reputation would sink if the product did. Thus, the combination
of corporate reputation, market research, and loan structure gave both players enough
comfort to proceed with this new real estate product.
Indeed, there is evidence that the synergy created at Water Tower Place did translate
into measurable economic performance. According to Elkin, a few years after opening,
UIDC performed a survey of the project's retail tenants, and found that 20-25% of the
shoppers were coming from the Ritz Carlton and other neighboring hotels. The study
also found that on average the hotel consumers were making larger purchases than other
shoppers. Although the study did not explicitly observe above-market rents, the finding
did suggest that retail revenues were increased by Water Tower's synergistic atmosphere.
In 1986, Water Tower Place won a ULI Award for Excellence, and the jury chose the
following relevant words for Water Tower Place: "As a mixed-use complex, Water
Tower Place has set a standard of excellence for Chicago's downtown. Water Tower's
atrium shopping mall accounts for the lion's share of all retail sales in the city's North
Michigan Avenue district."2 3 This statement also suggests that the project's synergy
has served an important role in its economic performance.
Diversification
Because Water Tower was financed with one loan, one would surmise that the
diversification benefit--the decrease in default risk--would have had value in the loan
negotiation process. However, mixed-use developments had not existed long enough for
developers or lenders to draw conclusions about MXD economic performance. 24
Diversification did, however, benefit the project by allowing increased design flexibility.
The multi-level retail was considered a highly risky innovation at Water Tower Place,
since retail had never been developed above street level with the exception of
freestanding department stores. However, the multi-level retail was financeable partly
because it was developed in combination with less risky uses. Thus, the diversification
of risk allowed flexibility in design and planning.
Development Risk
Without much in the way of precedent for this project, it would appear that both
lenders and borrowers were taking great project-specific risk. Though UIDC performed
and relied on several market studies during the planning phases, there were many
unanswered questions in regards to design, construction, absorption, and demand. As
an indication of the times, UIDC was able to proceed with permanent (and subsequently
construction) financing based on its excellent reputation, even though Water Tower Place
posed more risk that other projects before it. However, it must be noted that UIDC and
Marshall Fields had a substantial equity commitment as well. The real estate
development industry at the time was made up of large, institutional players, and each
was willing to bear considerable development risk in exchange for an undiluted return.
23 "The 1986 ULI Awards for Excellence", Urban Land November 1986, p. 20.
24 Real estate academia had not yet addressed the diversification effect either. The Hartzell,
Hekman, Miles article was not published until 1986.
Physical Flexibility and the Conversion Option
As discussed in Chapter Two, financing terms would theoretically affect physical design
issues. One might expect, for example, that if the developer is left with no option other
than a cross-collateralized, recourse loan, he or she would have incentive to address the
issues of design flexibility. This would give the developer additional versatility to
reshuffle the components (thus taking better advantage of diversification) and to adapt
to future market conditions.
Indeed, at Water Tower Place, the loan was implicitly cross-collateralized, and certain
changes were made after construction which demonstrate that a mixed-use development
can and did benefit from flexibility over the long-term.
First, Water Tower removed its amphitheater, which was not found to be a revenue-
generating use, and today a movie theater stands in its place. Second, and more
significantly, UIDC converted one floor of office space into an additional floor of
Marshall Fields; the 100,000 square foot floorplate was found to be much more
appropriate for retail than for an office tenant. Though the physical conversion incurred
cost, the basic structural elements and building systems did not have to be altered, hence
the benefit of responding to the market far outweighed the one-time construction
expense. Furthermore, UIDC was able to make the changes without affecting the legal
documentation of the project. The reciprocal easement agreement for Water Tower was
written between the hotel, the condominium association, and the "commercial" piece
(office/retail/garage), so a reconfiguration within the commercial component did not
affect the operating documents.
It is also interesting to note that conversion was more plausible because the project was
financed with one cross-collateralized loan. This conversion at Water Tower Place did
not affect the lender, but if the project had been financed by one lender for retail and one
for office, the strategic move might have been hampered.
Thus, Water Tower Place has continued to maximize revenue by reshuffling the uses
within the MXD to respond to a changing market place.
As mentioned above, the original permanent loan reached its term in 1991. The
refinancing of Water Tower will be discussed in Chapter Four.
COPLEY PLACE, BOSTON, MA.
Opened in 1984
Copley Place, also developed by UIDC, opened eight years later than Water Tower
Place. Although the expertise of UIDC remained consistent to both projects, Copley
was developed under a different set of site constraints, local political considerations
and economic conditions. Even so, both mixed-use developments demonstrate
interesting links between product and finance.
Copley Place--the first project in U.S. history to be built over a highway interchange--
was the long-awaited solution to a large, underutilized area between Boston's Back Bay
and the South End. The site, which was owned by the Massachusetts Turnpike
Authority, encompassed the air rights atop Route 90. Moreover, access to the site was
complicated by highway ramps and commuter train routes.25
The City and State had long envisioned a mixed-use project at this location for two
reasons. First, the 9.5-acre parcel included both a highly attractive triangular lot and an
equally awkward and undesirable lot. The Authority knew that it had to package both
lots into one development opportunity in order to achieve the development of both lots.
Second, the Authority anticipated that a) only a project of very high density could
support the exorbitant infrastructure cost that was required to make the site work, and
b) a single use of very high density could not be absorbed into the marketplace at that
site. Mixed-use was the only viable solution.
After the Authority tried unsuccessfully for years to revitalize the site, UIDC was given
rights to negotiate a 99-year ground lease and a master plan with the regulatory
authorities. The spaciousness of the 9.5 acre site, in addition to the local planning and
zoning requirements, dictated that Copley Place, unlike Water Tower, should be
horizontally-oriented. The horizontal plan worked well, as it fulfilled Copley Place's
role as a much needed pedestrian "corridor" between the Prudential Center/Hynes
Auditorium and Boston's famous Copley Square. The design was geared towards
maximizing the flow of pedestrians through a long, dynamic space. (At the time of
design, 60,000 commuters were expected to pass through Copley Place per day.) The
25 Unless otherwise noted, information on Copley Place was gathered from employees of JMB
and UIDC (see interview list), and "Copley Place," Urban Land April 1985, pp. 8-13.
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pedestrian nature of the project was naturally well-suited for a mixed-use development,
since it maximized the number of potential customers passing through the project. It is
interesting to note, however, that while both projects focused on the design philosophy
that customers would "make a day of it", Copley Place also encouraged pedestrians to
pass through the project on the way to something else. Both approaches focused on
attracting users into a dynamic atmosphere. At Water Tower the goal was to attract
people to stay within the self-contained MXD. At Copley, the goal was to encourage
pedestrians to enjoy the MXD in conjunction with the entire Back Bay area.
In describing the project's original goals and challenges, Elkin stated, "We perceived that
Boston already had two very successful outdoor spaces for human interaction--Faneuil
Hall and Newbury Street--but Boston did not have an indoor public space. We
envisioned that Copley Place would be that indoor space."26
Project Statistics
Project
Location
Year Completed
Project Cost*
Project Size
# Stories
Components:
Office
Retail
Parking
Hotel
Residential
Amenities
Water Tower Place
Chicago, IL
1976
$175 million
3.1 million sf
74
200,000 sf
725,000 sf
640 spaces
432 rooms
260 units
health club, theater
Copley Place
Boston, MA
1984
$400 million
3.7 million sf
38**
845,000 sf
375,000 sf
1,432 spaces
1,951 rooms
104 units
health club, theater,
community retail
* Project Costs are not adjusted for inflation.
** at tallest point
UIDC began the development process by performing several market feasibility studies.
As described by one of UIDC's original development managers, "In the late 1970s, so
many market factors were changing that we were constantly trying to adjust and
26 Norm Elkin, interview, June 1, 1995.
respond."2 7 At the time, studies showed that Boston was suffering from a substantial
shortage of two uses: hotel space and parking. The other two markets, office and retail,
were not as clearly in demand. At the time, Back Bay had little in the way of available
Class A office space. Although there was good potential for office demand, full market
absorption was viewed as risky. The same dichotomy applied to the retail component;
though UIDC perceived a need for more high-end retail space, there was concern that
Copley Place was too far from Boston's up-scale retail streets, Newbury and Boylston.
By this time, mixed-use development had been more widely implemented throughout the
country; however, the residents of Boston did not treat Copley Place like a known
quantity. In a display of unprecedented community involvement, over 25 citizen groups
took part in the design approvals process, and UIDC had to work very hard to keep the
project economically viable while cooperating with the community.
UIDC's market studies had to be carefully integrated with local input from the
neighborhood groups to produce a design that worked for the developers, the lenders,
and the community. Over the course of 200 local meetings, UIDC carefully negotiated
with the local constituency, agreeing in some cases to include certain uses, such as the
rental apartments and locally-run retail space, as a tradeoff for increased density. As a
result of this extreme political sensitivity, it was decided that the project would be built
on a fast-track basis, in order to proceed as quickly and smoothly as possible once key
points in the approvals process had been reached.
A major event in the planning of Copley Place occurred when one of UIDC's two retail
anchors unexpectedly backed out of the deal in 1979, part way through the development
process. At the time, UIDC decided that rather than seek another anchor, it would add
a second hotel to the project. At the same time, UIDC increased the square footage of
the speculative office component, thereby reshuffling project risk by assigning different
"weights" to the uses. Many months and $10 million later, the 3.5 million square foot
project eventually incorporated five uses: hotel, office, retail, residential and parking.2 8
27 "Copley Place", Urban Land April 1985, pp. 8-13.
28 Interestingly, MXDs in general were getting smaller in square footage. As opposed to an
average 1.7 million square feet in 1970s MXDs, the average size of 1980s MXDs was only 760,000
square feet. Copley, at 3.5 million square feet, was extremely large in comparison.
Schwanke, Smart and Kessler, "Looking at MXDs", pp. 20-27.
Initially, UIDC was in favor of contributing significant equity to the Copley Place
project, as it had at Water Tower. However, as the scope of the project grew, the option
of seeking equity partners became more attractive. UIDC formed a 50/50 joint venture
with Westin Hotels for the first hotel and a similar arrangement with the Marriott
Corporation for the second. For the central "commercial piece" (office/retail/garage),
UIDC committed the entire equity piece but then, upon project completion, sold 50% of
the equity to a real estate syndicate .
The process of procuring project lending started in 1980. Though UIDC did at first
consider seeking a single construction loan from one lending source, it quickly became
apparent that one loan would not be suitable for the different equity partnerships.
Therefore, UIDC sought different construction loans for each component.
Since the mid 1970s, inflation had dramatically altered the economic climate, and banks
had begun to use variable rate mortgages to protect themselves from interest rate risk. In
addition, insurance companies had begun to utilize participating mortgages and joint
ventures, as a means of creating upside to compensate for interest rate fluctuation and
inflation. In 1980, interest rates were at an all time high (18-20%). Fixed rate financing,
and therefore permanent financing, was highly unfavorable, given the rate levels.
As a result of the changing lending industry, borrowers had more leeway to construct
creative financing mechanisms. "Mini-perms" which used floating rate debt allowed the
borrower and lender to adapt more quickly to changing rates and still avoid yield
maintenance agreements. Debt joint ventures allowed borrowers to take advantage of
larger loan proceeds. Accrual mortgages and participating mortgages gave the developer
lower interest costs in the earlier years. Each of these instruments gave borrowers more
flexibility to create tailored financial structures for each individual project.
As lenders became more proactive in their involvement in real estate, new players
entered the equity side as well. As a result of federal legislation in the late 1960s which
created tax-driven partnerships for real estate, the national syndication business started
in the 1970s.2 9 Developers could now raise more equity and boost loan proceeds, in
exchange for giving up part of cash flow.3 0
In the early 1980s, Copley secured financing for the entire project with mini-perm and
open-ended construction loans, which made Copley Place the first major project in the
U.S. to be built without a permanent takeout arrangement. The advantages to short
term debt were clear: UIDC could avoid the cost of high fixed-rate long term financing,
UIDC could obtain commitments faster, thus continuing the momentum of the project,
and UIDC could obtain larger loan proceeds than with permanent financing. These
benefits outweighed the refinancing risk that UIDC assumed.
The first portion to break ground was the Westin hotel in 1980. Westin's 50% equity
position brought both upfront cash to the deal and institutional credit in the eyes of
lenders. The Westin loan came from Citibank--a floating rate, open-ended construction
loan for $85 million with a market-rate spread. After the Westin started, construction
began on the infrastructure platform which supported the "commercial piece" (the office,
retail and garage components). Without a permanent commitment, UIDC could not
procure construction funds for the infrastructure work, and had to finance the $22
million expenditure out of pocket. At the time, the risk of carrying the infrastructure
costs was more attractive than the burden of having to secure permanent financing.
In 1982, contingent upon completion of the platform, UIDC acquired a $140 million loan
commitment from Morgan Guaranty for the commercial piece. The loan had a five year
term with a floating rate and was recourse. Equity was 100% owned by UIDC, and, as
such, not cross-defaulted with the hotels or residential. Because the project was
fast-track 31 , the buildings were not designed to completion in 1982, and a guaranteed
maximum price had not been reached when Morgan Guaranty made its commitment. As
a result, the loan amount later rose to $190 million, though the loan increase was
primarily based on improvements to and changes in the project scope. In addition to
29 Leon Shilton, "Between a Rock and a Regulator: Today's Transaction Environment," Real
Estate Finance Journal Winter 1993, pp. 19-26.
30 Richard N. Thielen, "Evaluating Real Estate Syndications", Real Estate Finance, Spring
1984, pp. 8-14.
31 As defined by the AIA, a fast-track project is broken into multiple packages, which are then
bid and awarded at different times. Some are awarded before design is completed, effectively
overlapping design and construction.
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Morgan Guaranty's loan, the commercial piece was financed ($18 million) by the then
largest UDAG grant ever to be issued by HUD.
Construction on the Marriott started in 1982. The construction loan ($102 million),
which was floating-rate and open-ended as well, was supplied by a bank consortium
led by First National Bank of Chicago.32 Again, the loan was not cross-defaulted with
the other components. Given the inherent project risk behind hotel work, and the fact
that the hotel loans were non-recourse, both the Westin and Marriott loan spreads were
50-75 basis points above the commercial piece spread.
The residential component, which consisted of 26 moderate income rental units and 78
co-operative units, started construction in 1984. The combination of rental and co-ops
(not a typical Boston product) was not palatable to residential lenders, so UIDC
financed that component ($6 million) out of its own lines of credit. UIDC could not
offer condominiums because the land was tied to a ground lease.
When JMB acquired UIDC in 1984, the shape of the financial structure changed at JMB's
insistence. The Morgan Guaranty loan on the commercial component was paid off, in
fulfillment of certain legal stipulations upon dissolution of UIDC. The Westin loan was
also paid off. Aetna provided the takeouts for both loans. Furthermore, Aetna was
able to offer JMB fixed rate, non-recourse loans. In exchange for fixing the rate and
increasing the funding levels, however, Aetna received additional collateral on a
property in Texas. The three remaining Copley Place loans were still not cross-
collateralized. Also in 1984, 50% of the commercial piece equity was sold to one of
JMB's real estate syndications (JMB/Carlyle), so that later in the year when JMB
acquired UIDC, the commercial piece was split between JMB and JMB/Carlyle.
Today, the financing structure looks relatively similar to its original 1980 framework.
Copley Place is owned by three entities: United Parcel Service (who purchased the
Marriott equity in 1984 and 1994), JMB and JMB/Carlyle (the commercial piece) and
JMB/Westin (the Westin). The debt is split into three loans, two provided by Aetna,
and the third by the First Chicago Bank consortium.
32 Since 1982, this loan has been extended twice, and as anticipated, the first extension
involved a substantial decrease in interest rate.
Synergy
Whereas Water Tower Place was designed--and subsequently financed--as one single
entity, Copley Place was designed and financed as a grouping of individual buildings.
The basic layout of the project, particularly its horizontal nature, meant that there was
less emphasis on the bundling of uses. At Copley, the lenders each assessed their
components as freestanding buildings, according to Gordon Keiser, Senior Vice President
at JMB. Furthermore, the project was not cross-collateralized. Therefore, one would
expect that neither developer nor lender was markedly concerned with the link between
synergy and economic performance. Because the debt was short term, they also
presumably had little interest in the long term appreciation of the project.
Indeed, synergy did not play a large role in the procurement of financing. Lenders
looked at the individual rent projections of their separate components. Synergy, was
viewed, however, as a positive factor for the general viability of the project. The
concept of a large, indoor environment (particularly during Boston's winter months) was
appealing to lenders as a marketing strategy. Interestingly, Copley Place has since been
highly praised for achieving that level of synergy. According to the jury for the 1988 ULI
Awards for Excellence: "No other project in Boston has contributed more to the city's
vitality and sense of community than Copley Place. This large-scale, mixed-use project
has created a thriving commercial environment linking diverse neighborhoods in Boston's
Back Bay."3 3
Diversification
Since each component at Copley was addressed separately, lenders were
understandably less interested in the overall cash flow of the project. Therefore,
diversification was not used as a strong argument for Copley Place.
However, diversification did enter the picture in terms of project planning. For example,
UIDC would not have been able to construct a one-anchor retail mall as a free-standing
project; lenders would never have taken that risk. However, Morgan Guaranty was
willing to look at the commercial piece as long as it was part of a larger, continuous
project, with unofficial anchors a few blocks away at Prudential Center. Furthermore,
the additional risk taken when UIDC increased the speculative office to 845,000 square
feet would presumably not have been appealing in a freestanding office project. In
33 "1988 ULI Awards for Excellence," Urban Land, December 1988, p. 23.
general, the reshuffling of uses throughout the development phase allowed UIDC to
come up with the most viable, most diversified project that could be built at the time.
As Stuart Nathan, Executive Vice President at JMB pointed out, Copley's financing
benefited from every form of diversification. First, the project combined long term loans
with short terms loans, thereby spreading the refinancing risk across time. Second, the
project combined both leased space and purchased space, thereby producing different
types of income. Third, the project carried construction loans as well as permanent
loans, thereby diversifying terms and rates. This produced a more complicated, yet
more diversified financial structure than Water Tower's, one which could more easily
adapt to future financial cycles.
Development Risk
UIDC overcame a staggering combination of development risks: site constraints,
technical infrastructure challenges, political scrutiny, complications associated with fast-
track and the use of three different contractors, the burden of procuring different
financing sources, and the negotiation of an unusually complicated reciprocal easement
agreement.
UIDC's experience from Water Tower Place was crucial in solving this labyrinth of
issues. Furthermore, UIDC took advantage of the flexible nature of real estate financing
during the early 1980s to bring its product into fruition. UIDC controlled the immense
risk of the project by dividing it into small pieces--distributing part to its equity partners
and part to its lenders. Also, by protecting the project from cross-collateralization,
UIDC was able to include the riskier components without jeopardizing the entire project.
It is interesting to note that throughout the industry, the issue of "parts vs. whole" was
being addressed. Depending on the circumstances, projects were financed either as
whole entities or as separate components. However, it does appear that the majority of
projects were handled as a single entity (through either debt or equity partnerships)
rather than as a kit of parts. In that light, Copley Place was unique. According to an
Urban Land Institute 1986 survey of mixed-use projects, 38% of MXDs surveyed were
owned by a single entity; 37% were owned by multiple owners of entire project, and 25%
(including Copley) were owned by separate owners of components. Copley falls into
the last category. For financing, 33% were financed by a single source; 41% by multiple
sources and 26% (including Copley) by multiple sources and by component. 34
Once the development phase had been completed, JMB restructured the financing to its
advantage, and was able to significantly reduce and control financing costs. Debt
service was now fixed for the Westin and the commercial piece. The project was
financed by separate sources, which meant that it was still not cross-collateralized.
Aetna's loans were not participating mortgages, which meant that JMB's equity joint
ventures had no additional burden of dilution. Most importantly, the loans were non-
recourse.
Physical Flexibility and the Conversion Option
Compared to Water Tower, Copley was relatively "unbundled" in terms of design and
finance. However, the commercial piece at Copley was cross-collateralized by Morgan
Guaranty's loan. Interestingly, the issue of physical flexibility was discussed for this
component. As mentioned earlier, the speculative office space (845,000 square feet)
was thought to be very risky, and UIDC wished to hedge its position in case leasing did
not proceed as anticipated. During the design phase, there was discussion of potential
conversion from office to retail space. The issue arose again in 1984, when the project
was just opening and JMB was acquiring UIDC. However, it was determined that the
conversion would be far too expensive, and successful office leasing made the issue
irrelevant.
34 Schwanke, Smart, and Kessler, "Looking at MXDs," pp. 20-27.
900 NORTH MICHIGAN AVENUE, CHICAGO, IL.
Opened in 1988
In many ways, 900 North Michigan serves as the culmination of JMB/Urban's
achievement in mixed-use development. From the architectural treatment of pedestrian
entrances, to the integration of project amenities, to the intricacy of the loan structure,
the project reflects lessons learned from its predecessors, Water Tower and Copley.
900 North Michigan is a creative, viable real estate product that works well in today's
market and is expected to adapt well to future changes in the real estate and capital
markets.
In 1984, as part of its acquisition of UIDC, JMB took ownership of the architectural
design and permits for 900 North Michigan Avenue. The site was perfectly situated on
Chicago's illustrious Michigan Avenue, just blocks from Hancock Tower and Water
Tower Place, and a short walk from Lake Michigan. Similar to both Water Tower and
Copley Place, 900 North Michigan Avenue was deemed a good site for mixed-use
development chiefly for economic reasons. The location was uniquely suited for many
uses: retail and hotel (for which Michigan Avenue was widely known), residential
condos (targeted towards an upscale market seeking an address along Chicago's "Gold
Coast"), and office space (designated for a niche market made up of image-oriented,
professional firms).3 5
Like Water Tower and Copley, 900 North Michigan was designed to Class A standards,
offering tenants, residents and guests a prestigious, image-oriented address on Michigan
Avenue. The mix of uses was quite similar to Water Tower's, with the key difference
that 900 North had a larger office component (550,000 square feet as opposed to
200,000).
Whereas Water Tower Place had been developed as one of the nation's earliest large-
scale mixed-use projects, 900 North Michigan was one of the last to be completed before
the real estate recession of the late 1980s. In the years that had passed between the
development of the Houston Galleria and 900 North Michigan, the mixed-use product
had become increasingly sophisticated. MXDs in the 1980s were smaller on average
35 Unless otherwise noted, all information for 900 North Michigan was gathered from
employees of JMB (see interview list).
and more sensitive to their surrounding physical environments than their predecessors of
the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, 1980s MXDs on average had a better mix of
economically self-sustaining uses.3 6
Like Water Tower, 900 North Michigan was designed as a vertical mixed-use
development. Furthermore, 900 North Michigan's financing strategy was similar to
Water Tower's; capital was obtained from one source rather than many. In this sense,
both projects can be considered "bundled" physically and financially. However, the
comparison only applies to the general framework of the two projects; in terms of
details, 900 North Michigan is a more complex, and therefore potentially more versatile,
project.
The development and management team for 900 North looked closely at former MXD
designs and determined that a mixed-use project had to fulfill two key architectural
challenges. One, the project had to work as an integrated whole --a city within a
building--so that casual shoppers, full-time residents and workers alike could enjoy all
the various elements of the project. Two, the project also had to work as a collection of
36 Schwanke, Mixed-Use Development Handbook.
Project Statistics
Project Water Tower Place Copley Place 900 North Michigan
Location Chicago, IL Boston, MA Chicago, IL
Year Completed 1976 1984 1988
Project Cost* $175 million $400 million $450 million
Project Size 3.1 million sf 3.7 million sf 2.7 million sf
# Stories 74 38** 66
Components:
Office 200,000 sf 845,000 sf 550,000 sf
Retail 725,000 sf 375,000 sf 450,000 sf
Parking 640 spaces 1,432 spaces 1,450 spaces
Hotel 432 rooms 1,951 rooms 343 rooms
Residential 260 units 104 units 106 units
Amenities health club, theater health club, theater, health club, theater,
community retail indoor pool
*Project Costs are not adjusted for inflation.
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separate components. UIDC and JMB had successfully accomplished the first goal at
both Water Tower and Copley. However, the second had not always been there; Water
Tower had missed some key connections between components, and Copley Place had
not fully provided a distinguished identity for some of the uses, particularly the office
component. 900 North Michigan set out to accomplish both.
The key to achieving that dual identity was the internal circulation system at 900 North.
Each component--hotel, residential, retail, office and parking--had its own exclusive
street-level entrance with its own security staff, and each had its separate elevator core.
At the same time, each component had its own private accessway to the sixth level of
the retail mall, which served as the heart of the project's public domain. On the sixth
level, amongst restaurants and shops, there were four discrete access points (all secured)
to the office tower, the hotel, the residences, and the parking garage. Thus, each
component had its own private and separate identity, yet enjoyed convenient usage of
all other components.
The financing of 900 North Michigan was equally thorough. JMB began this process in
1985, shortly after JMB acquired UIDC. According to Deborah Schenk, Senior Vice
President at JMB, the developer's first decision was whether to obtain a permanent
financing commitment, or to proceed without one, as they had at Copley Place. Many
factors played a role in this decision. At the time, interest rates were at a reasonable
level, but JMB felt that it stood a good chance of securing a lower rate if it waited. On
the other hand, various elements of the project, particularly the hotel, posed
considerable uncertainty, and JMB did not want to bear the entire project leasing and
market risk. Furthermore, the total project cost, over $400 million, excluded the vast
majority of lenders from even considering this deal, so JMB felt that it had to garner a
preliminary commitment from one of the feasible capital sources. By procuring a takeout
commitment, JMB stood a better chance of obtaining 100% financing, which would in
turn allow JMB to secure 100% construction financing. Furthermore, JMB acknowledged
that general capital market conditions were relatively favorable at the time, and that
postponement of permanent financing might jeopardize the project. JMB decided to
seek a permanent financing commitment.
Once the decision was made to seek a takeout, JMB focused on two key goals. First, it
wished to secure financing in the most cost efficient manner, preferably from one capital
source. Nathan explained that with a single lender, the borrower only needed to
coordinate with one set of lending policies and one corporate lending "culture", which
posed an advantage both in the initial lending process and throughout the life of the
project. Second, JMB wished to avoid cross-collateralization, thereby keeping each
component as separate and flexible as possible.
By 1985, construction levels had risen tremendously, and the industry was beginning to
acknowledge signs of overbuilding. Because of the increasing level of lender caution,
obtaining a forward commitment was not possible without agreeing to a participating
loan.3 7 This was particularly true for developers seeking 100% financing.
Lenders had also taken on increasing risk by joint venturing with developers. In the mid
1970s, as participating debt had gained popularity, insurance companies had also
started seeking equity positions in exchange for committing takeout financing. In this
arrangement, the lender was protected by certain project risk because the agreements
were subject to construction completion and leasing requirements. Eventually, however,
lenders further increased their risk by agreeing to do front-end joint ventures, in which
they committed to equity positions prior to the start of construction, thereby fully
sharing project risk.
In 1985, JMB presented the deal to the three sizable lenders in the market: Prudential
Insurance, MetLife, and Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA).
Prudential was not interested in the deal, and MetLife priced the deal very
conservatively because of the hotel risk. TIAA was able to offer the most competitive
rates, and gave its preliminary commitment for the project. As with Water Tower Place,
the condos were not included in the permanent loan.
After considerable negotiation, JMB and TIAA came up with a permanent financing
package that worked well for both parties. TIAA would commit to finance 100% of
project costs, yet the funds would be divided into separate loans with separate rates for
each major component. Once again, design mirrored financing. The project was treated
simultaneously as a single entity and as a set of distinct parts.
37 Robert H. Gidel, "Interim Joint Ventures: Panacea or Paranoia?" Real Estate Finance Journal,
Summer 1985, pp. 32-38.
The deal was structured as follows. One first mortgage financed the hotel component
($70 million priced at 10.75%), and another first mortgage financed the "commercial
piece" (office/retail/garage) ($228.5 million at 10.25%). Both loans were non-recourse
and long term (35 years). In addition, TIAA agreed to purchase the project site from
JMB for $60 million and lease it back to the project ownership. The ground lease was
subordinated to both first mortgages.
In addition, second and third mortgages were placed behind the commercial loan. The
second mortgage was created for operating deficits; TIAA committed to fund 50% of
operating deficits on the commercial piece, up to $20 million. A third mortgage on the
commercial component was created in the amount of $50.5 million. The mortgages were
paid out of available cash flow, with accrual features, yet interest rates were market
rate. A second mortgage was also placed on the hotel to fund 100% of its operating
deficits up to $10 million.
The deal gave 900 North Michigan the best of both worlds. Similar to Water Tower
Place, it had a single source of capital, which meant less complication. Similar to
Copley Place, it avoided cross-collateralization to the greatest extent possible, thereby
allowing the flexibility to default or refinance the hotel without losing the commercial
piece. Furthermore, JMB subdivided the components so that each could be treated as
separate legal entities.3 8
Comparison of Project Financial Structures
Water Tower Copley Place 900 North Michigan
Project Cost* $175 million $400 million $450 million
Full Cross-Collateralization Yes No No
Recourse No Partial No
Fixed Rate Yes Partial Yes
Term of Loan Long Short Long
Takeout Financing Commitment Yes No Yes
Participating Mortgage No No Yes
*Project costs are not adjusted for inflation.
38 The commercial parcel includes the retail, office and garage components and all the air
rights above them, with the exception of the condos and the hotel parcel.
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For TIAA, the deal worked well too. The hotel loan earned a higher spread, thus
compensating TIAA for the added risk, while the commercial component could be given
a more competitive rate. In addition, TIAA secured upside potential by requiring
participating mortgages, in exchange for bearing the interest rate risk of a takeout
commitment.
Overall, the deal addressed issues of market adaptability and timing by recognizing that
a mixed-use project of this scope would take some time to stabilize. For example, the
first mortgages had a pay rate which was less than the coupon rate for the first five
years, which lowered debt service in the initial years. Furthermore, the cash-flow feature
of the second and third mortgages allowed debt service to adjust with the performance
of the project. Finally, operating deficits from the first mortgages were funded in part by
the second mortgages, which provided considerable relief during lease-up. The overall
diversity of terms between the various loans allowed 900 North more time and more
flexibility to respond to the market.
The construction loan was subsequently procured by a consortium of banks, and was
larger than the permanent loan, in order to cover the condos. When construction was
completed, two of the banks committed to a short term loan to finance the condos,
which were expected to sell over the first 2-3 years. The condo units sold at a record
pace, and the proceeds were used to pay down the construction loan. The overage went
towards JMB's share of operating deficits.
In October 1988, just after the opening of the office and retail components, TIAA
assumed the takeout as scheduled. Today, all four mortgages remain unchanged. JMB
has a lockout period of 17 years, at which time it must give TIAA first right of refusal to
refinance the project.
Synergy
As addressed above, 900 North's circulation plan greatly improved the opportunity for
synergy between the uses, and did not have to rely on untested design concepts to do so.
At the same time, 900 North's design kept the components relatively separate, so that
the project minimized the negative effects of multiple uses. At 900 North, there was a
strong interest on the part of both developer and lender to enhance economic
performance through synergy. Both participants had a stake in the upside potential of
the project: JMB through equity and TIAA through contingent interest. Furthermore,
given that the loans matured in 35 years, there was aligned interest in the long term
viability of the project--tenant retention, occupancy levels, etc.
According to Frank Barrios, General Manager of 900 North Michigan, the synergy
created by the project has not translated into premiums on rents to date. However, the
project has created a highly prestigious image, which tenants value very highly. 900
North's market image has kept the project competitive with other properties in its
market.
Diversification
Although diversification did not directly affect the terms of TIAA's loans, diversification
did play a role in the financing. Because the project was mixed-use, JMB had a certain
degree of versatility in allocating project costs. The hotel provides a perfect example of
this added flexibility. Based on cash flow projections for the hotel, TIAA would not
lend more than $70 million, which was not sufficient to fund the hotel. However, TIAA
was willing to allocate increased loan proceeds towards the commercial component,
based on projected net operating income, and because the commercial component had
met certain pre-leasing requirements. Therefore, JMB could procure funds to cover the
whole project. Thus, JMB was able to construct a hotel by diversifying it with other
uses, while 100% of the cost of a freestanding hotel would not have been financeable.
The same allocation issue affected the condos. Even though JMB's post-construction
loan on the condos covered a 2-3 year sales period, this still meant considerable risk for
JMB. If the condos did not sell, JMB would have to pay the loan out of pocket or try to
refinance. Hence, JMB and the condo lenders made the cost allocation for the condos
slim, so that JMB's exposure was minimized.
Furthermore, it is interesting to examine the use of participating debt at 900 North. If
mixed-use projects produce a more stable income stream than single-use projects, then
the upside potential for contingent interest is restricted. This is advantageous to the
borrower and disadvantageous to the lender. On the other hand, if the Mouchly/Peiser
theory is valid, then mixed-use projects appreciate to a greater extent than single-use,
and the back-end participation is presumably greater. At 900 North Michigan, the
success of the participation clause depends on which effect--low volatility or high
returns--is stronger. The timing is presumably suitable to both parties; JMB needs the
relief and flexibility in the short term, when the project is still stabilizing, yet can
"afford" the diffusion of cash flow in the long term, when the project has increased in
value.
Development Risk
Although the project was extremely complex to design and construct, JMB stood to gain
from the development, management, leasing and operations experience of its employees.
According to employees at both JMB and TIAA, UIDC/JMB's reputation was the key
factor driving TIAA's commitment to the project. According to Schenk, this deal made it
through its complex negotiations process because of the lasting relationships which were
formed along the way.
JMB worked to minimize its development risk in a number of ways. First, JMB avoided
fast-track construction, which was regarded in hindsight a mistake in the development
of Copley. Second, JMB designed the project so that each component, to the fullest
extent possible, responded to the market requirements of that particular use. Third, JMB
was able to acquire a fixed-rate, permanent funding commitment from TIAA, an
experienced lender in the area of mixed-use development. This commitment, and the
fact that JMB met pre-leasing funding conditions prior to the start of construction,
allowed JMB to secure 100% construction financing, which minimized interest rate risk
and capital market risk.
As with its predecessors, timing was a risk at 900 North Michigan. Absorption rates
held some positive and negative surprises for JMB. Feasibility analyses had predicted
that the condominiums and hotel components would be the weakest in the project;
however, both were extremely successful from the start. The office portion was 100%
occupied as of July 1989, including two large, long-term tenants. Retail experienced
acceptable occupancy levels but suffered from below proforma rents, due to the late
1980s glut of retail on Michigan Avenue and the overall financial condition for national
retailers in the late 1980s. Parking was a less significant source of revenue than
originally anticipated due to a management decision to offer reduced parking rates to
shoppers. Nevertheless, JMB and TIAA had made full provision for absorption
problems through the second mortgage for the funding of operating deficits and the
accrual features of the mortgage loans.
Physical Flexibility and the Conversion Option
Like Copley, 900 North was not cross-collateralized. Therefore, one would expect less
concern with flexibility and conversion. Indeed, the future flexibility of the building was
not addressed during the project planning process. According to Barrios, conversion
from one use to another would not be suitable, because the costs would be unjustifiably
burdensome and considerable rentable square footage would be lost.
CASE SUMMARY
These three highly regarded projects--Water Tower Place, Copley Place, and 900 North
Michigan Avenue--represent three distinct points along the historical continuum of
mixed-use development. In hindsight, each project took advantage of different unique
attributes of mixed-use development to gain the cooperation of lenders and other project
participants.
A brief summary of each project and its unique approach sheds light on the gradual
evolution of mixed-use development. In the early 1970s, Water Tower Place was
developed in an industry made up of large, long-term players, each willing to take
considerable risk in exchange for undiluted returns. With its upstanding reputation and
the stability of the real estate lending industry, UIDC focused heavily on creating
synergy, and achieved certain innovations--multi-level retail, destination office, and the
inclusion of new amenities--without losing the commitment of its lenders. Furthermore,
after project completion, UIDC took advantage of the physical conversion option to
maximize responsiveness to the market.
In the early 1980s, Copley Place was developed in an entirely different lending
landscape. Real estate was gaining popularity as an asset class, scores of new players
had entered the industry, and competition was growing. Rather than seeking one long
term investor, Copley involved a myriad of financial players, each interested in carving
its own slice of risk and return out of the project. Commitments were based on returns
and tax benefits rather than relationships, and were generally short term. As such, it
was more appropriate for UIDC to focus on diversification and the management of
development risk than synergy. The project was divided into a number of separate
entities; risky components were shuffled together with less risky uses; and UIDC
arranged a diversified set of loan terms to limit refinancing risk.
In the mid 1980s, 900 North Michigan was completed in a real estate environment that
was rapidly cooling off. 900 North was successful in that it reflected the advantages of
both its predecessors, yet established a new level of innovation. The project buttressed
its upside with synergistic design, and truncated its downside with diversification and
the legal separation of uses. JMB and TIAA created a financing arrangement that
managed risk while fully capitalizing on the unique attributes of mixed-use.
In summary, these cases demonstrate a progressively sophisticated utilization of
financial vehicles, market responsiveness, and risk management to implement projects of
great size and complexity. The success of the trio suggests that regardless of market
conditions and economic trends, an innovative project can be successfully supported by
a well-conceived financial and legal framework.
CHAPTER FOUR
In the last five to seven years, the evolution of mixed-use development has been
interrupted by the severe real estate recession. Nonetheless, industry participants
generally believe that mixed-use projects will be built again, and it is important to
examine the features of this innovative product type that are most suited for the
economic climate of the future. Chapter Four examines the recent link between the real
estate industry and the capital markets to draw conclusions about the shape of mixed-
use development in the future.
EVOLVING FINANCIAL MECHANISMS
Though construction virtually came to a halt soon after the opening of 900 North
Michigan, innovation in real estate financing did not, and the industry has continued to
search for more efficient ways to bring successful real estate products to investors. By
the late 1980s, supply had become completely unhitched from demand, and rents and
property prices thereafter steadily declined throughout the U.S. As short term loans on
hundreds of projects matured, the lending industry discontinued its supply of real estate
capital.
In response, the public capital markets looked for ways to fill the vacuum, and did so by
reviving two financing mechanisms: the real estate investment trust (REIT) and the
commercial mortgage backed security (CMBS). The REIT served as a way to finance real
estate equity through public securities, the CMBS through securitized debt. Both
instruments reduced the cost of capital for real estate holders, created liquidity for real
estate investors, and provided tax benefits for all participants.
A brief return to the Water Tower case illustrates how these renewed financial
mechanisms apply to mixed-use development.
Water Tower Place
In Chapter Three, Water Tower Place was presented as the most simple and traditional
of the three financial deals. However, in the early 1990s, Water Tower was refinanced
to take advantage of a new real estate lending source: the capital markets.
In 1991, the 15-year Aetna/MetLife loan on Water Tower Place matured. At the time,
conventional lending had largely dried up, but due to the high profile success of Water
Tower Place, traditional lending still represented an option. At the time, JMB wished to
increase the level of debt based on the project's appreciation over the last 15 years.3 9
JMB received proposals from two life insurance companies and one bank group for the
refinancing; however, Goldman Sachs offered the most competitive deal in the form of a
single-asset CMBS. Goldman Sachs and JMB negotiated terms that would create one of
the first non-RTC CMBS transactions of the 1990s. Goldman Sachs sold $170 million of
debt securities to investors at a competitive interest rate which was lower than the
original Aetna/MetLife loan and lower than rates offered by the traditional sources. 40
The securitized offering did not, however, include the hotel, which was considered
(similar to 900 North Michigan) the riskiest component of the project. On the one hand,
this meant that JMB could keep the hotel separate and avoid cross-collateralization. On
the other hand, JMB now had to seek hotel financing from conventional sources. Though
JMB could market the benefits of synergy by emphasizing that the hotel was part of a
mixed-use development, it had to finance the hotel as a free-standing entity. After
considerable effort, JMB received a commitment from a French lender for a five year,
floating rate loan of $30 million, with the additional requirement that JMB purchase an
interest rate cap. Though this arrangement was not optimal, JMB accepted it.
In some ways, the timing of the Water Tower refinancing was advantageous to JMB. In
the early 1990s, the rating agencies' real estate underwriting policies were still being
formulated. On the Water Tower deal, the agencies agreed to a $160 million (AA)
tranche and a $10 million tranche which was unrated by Moody's and rated (AA-) by
Duff & Phelps.4 1 Since then, the rating agencies have tightened their underwriting
standards for debt service coverage and loan-to-value ratio. According to Keiser, Water
Tower Place might not have received the same tranche structure if it had been securitized
today (based on the cash flow presented in 1991).
39 All information for Water Tower Place was gathered from JMB and UIDC employees (see
interview list).
40 Securities were sold to private investors under 144A conditions, thus the interest rate is
proprietary.
41 The unrated (or AA-) tranche was priced 60 basis points higher than the AA piece.
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Water Tower's repositioning from traditional to securitized financing had several
interesting implications. First, at a time of capital shortage, JMB was able to refinance
the project with fixed rate financing (with the exception of the hotel) . Second, JMB was
able to double the debt level placed on the project from $100 million to $200 million
($170 CMBS plus $30 hotel), thereby increasing its leverage. Third, JMB removed the
hotel from cross-collateralization, thereby splitting the risk into discrete parts. Because
the project had already been developed, and the reciprocal easement agreement already
drafted, the introduction of a second lending source did not pose considerable legal or
administrative problems. Though JMB placed floating rate debt on the hotel, it had the
option to seek more favorable terms at any time during the term, as the debt was entirely
prepayable without penalty.
At this point, the specific attributes of mixed-use development were generally
recognized as suitable for debt securitization. Diversification was more widely
recognized, since the lending community had watched the property types fluctuate
differently during the late 1980s real estate debacle. With an income stream that was
potentially more stable over the long-term than single-use, mixed-use development
served as a good single-asset CMBS.
In 1993, Water Tower Place was restructured to incorporate yet another 1990s financing
vehicle: the equity REIT. In October of that year, JMB formed Urban Shopping Centers,
Inc., a REIT with a market capitalization of over $400 million, comprised mostly of high
quality super-regional and regional malls.
Similar to the CMBS, the REIT included the equity of the commercial component, but did
not include the hotel. The hotel equity was split 75% by JMB and 25% by the hotel
operator. As such, both the debt and equity portions of the hotel were now separated
from the rest of the project.
FLEXIBILITY AS THE FUTURE FOCUS
The success of the Water Tower refinancing demonstrates that the real estate industry
now enjoys yet another level of flexibility. As discussed in Chapter Two and evidenced
in Chapter Three, many of the qualities which make mixed-use unique are centered
around flexibility. Synergy is a market advantage which allows a project to appeal to a
very diverse set of users in any number of different ways. Diversification allows the
developer and lender to blend and reshuffle different uses so that the project is
economically viable now and in the future. Physical conversion allows the developer to
achieve what most projects can't: to physically shift one use to another in order to
respond to emerging market conditions. If planned properly, the mixed-use
development is built to endure long term shifts in both the real estate and financial
markets.
Having observed and examined these three cases and others, it appears that future
generations of mixed-use development must continue to capitalize upon the unique
qualities of mixed-use development. This challenge can be categorized into three key
areas of flexibility: financial, design, and legal.
Finance
According to Gordon Keiser at JMB, since the real estate crash, lender perception of
mixed-use development has changed. Keiser claims that lenders are now acutely aware
that different product types moved differently through the economic turmoil of the past
seven years. 42 Today, Keiser can show lenders how the various component rents
fluctuate, whereas the net operating income of the whole project stays relatively stable.
Diversification has become a significant factor in the negotiation process, and according
to Keiser, lenders recognize it to the extent that they are willing to increase loan
proceeds.
This suggests that as real estate data becomes increasingly available in the industry
through electronic information services and through an increased willingness to perform
this type of analysis, diversification may increasingly become a key advantage of mixed-
use development.
While the real estate recession has indirectly highlighted the advantage of mixed-use
development as discussed above, another change in lending will hurt mixed-use.
Recently, lenders have set very stringent policies in order to decrease average loan
amounts. According to a number of sources in the lending industry, lenders are limiting
loan proceeds to $100 million. This means that developers or owners of mixed-use who
wish to acquire, develop or refinance with traditional lenders will be forced to employ
more than one source of financing. Though this will not necessarily raise the cost of
42 Indeed, just in looking at the three cases, the risk shifted between product types over time;
Water Tower's greatest risk was the retail and condos, Copley Place the office component, and
900 North the hotel.
capital, it will prohibit single-source lending structures like 900 North Michigan's, at
least in the foreseeable future.
A clear solution to the loan limit problem would be the use of REITs or CMBS. Though
both vehicles involve extensive legal and administrative effort at inception, both
ironically simplify actual project lending and create economies of scale.
Through a REIT, for example, a company can purchase an existing mixed-use
development relatively efficiently. The REIT can commit cash for 50% of the purchase
price and finance the remainder with secured or unsecured debt. The REIT therefore
enjoys an undiluted equity position, and quicker, less expensive use of debt financing. In
regards to new development, the use of REITs is less certain, since most of the focus has
been on the acquisition of existing properties. New development may not be suitable for
REITs, since the commitment of funds to a non-revenue-generating investment
(construction) may have too strong a negative impact on earnings. This problem would
be particularly apparent with mixed-use developments, since they take longer to design
and construct.
CMBS poses some of the same advantages as REITs. The project can most likely be
financed with one loan, thus solving the single-source challenge. The "lumpy" risk of
mixed-use development which is caused by the combination of different uses is handled
well by tranching. Tranches create different risk profiles, so that each investor can
assume its desired level of risk in the MXD investment. In addition, CMBS increases
liquidity for all parties involved , which allows projects of very large size, such as
MXDs, to more easily acquire financing. According to Wayne Brandt, Director at
Nomura Securities International, loan size in CMBS today ranges from $30 million to
$300 million, with an average size of approximately $100 million.4 3
The pertinent question is whether these new instruments, REITs and CMBS, will allow
more innovation in the design of mixed-use developments. According to Brandt, the
chief concerns of underwriters are not the specifics of design and amenities but 1) the
existing cash flows and 2) any complications in the legal ownership structure of the
project. Therefore, it appears that innovation will be tolerated by CMBS as long as the
project has established a stable net operating income. REITs, on the other hand, may be
43 Wayne Brandt, interview, July 7, 1995.
less tolerant of innovation, as REITs rely on growth to increase equity value and may not
tolerate untested market ideas at the risk of harming periodic earnings.
With Water Tower Place, neither the REIT nor the CMBS included the hotel, which
indicates a degree of risk aversion from both financial mechanisms. However, it should
be noted that the advantage of both REITs and CMBS is that at a given price, they will
finance any real estate product, whereas traditional lenders are more inclined to give an
"all or nothing" response.
Design
As theorized in Chapter Two, a project which can be physically modified in response to
market trends holds more value in the long run. With the exception of Water Tower
Place, the three cases did not provide extensive examples of this strategy. While this
could be a function of the financial and legal structures behind these projects, it could
also be a function of time. The cost of converting square footage may only be justified
when a project has aged considerably, or when a building has lost its competitive
position to newer buildings in the market. To illustrate the advantages of flexible design,
it is useful to examine one of the nation's first mixed-use developments, the Prudential
Center. The focus on flexibility demonstrated by the Prudential's recent reshaping
provides an excellent example of the value of physical flexibility.
The Prudential Center, Boston, MA
Developed in 1965 by the Prudential Insurance Company of America, the original
Prudential Center was 4.3 million square feet in size. The project's primary use was
office space (1.7 million square feet), with sizable components in housing (781 high-rise
apartments), retail (467,000 square feet), hotel (1,208 rooms) and parking (3,100
spaces).
In the mid 1980s, in response to the competition created by recently completed Copley
Place and a general need to add flexibility to its real estate portfolio, Prudential began
the planning stages for a major redevelopment and expansion plan for the site.
The approach for reaching all three goals was to create a plan that was flexible for the
future. Prudential's design team conceived of a master plan that included five new
development sites, (1.5 million square feet of office space, condominiums, and a local
commercial center), each of which could be developed separately. Unlike previous
expansion plans that Prudential had considered, this master plan did not require
exorbitant infrastructure changes, so that the Prudential could build one component
without having to build the others to justify the cost. For each site, Prudential had the
flexibility to either act as leading developer, joint venture partner, or landlord to a third
party.
As written by Gary Hack, professor at MIT and a lead designer in the Prudential master
plan effort, "As the result of an agreed-upon massing scheme, each block can be
designed by a different architect, and can be constructed in almost any sequence
imaginable. Prudential was attracted to this flexibility, which allows it to respond to
emerging opportunities and changing markets."44 Furthermore, Prudential worked with
the City of Boston to terminate an ordinance that had regulated the project since
inception, so that Prudential now has the flexibility to sell, syndicate or refinance any of
the existing components on the site. Though the parcels remain unbuilt until market
conditions merit development, the flexibility of the master plan has inherently created
additional value.
Legal Structure
Given the added layer of development and operational complexity in mixed-use
developments, the legal framework must include reciprocal easement agreements,
contracts with hotel operators, and agreements with condo associations, not to mention
conventional financing documents. As pointed out in 900 North Michigan, although the
legal subdivision was a complicated and expensive procedure, it allows JMB full
flexibility to sell the leasehold improvements or refinance, which paves the way for
versatility in future markets.
Many approaches to legal flexibility exist, and one example in particular, the Denver
Dry Goods Building, demonstrates an increasingly common solution to creating value
through a strategic framework.
Denver Dry Goods Building, Denver, CO
Developed by the Affordable Housing Development Company (AHDC) in 1993 (in
conjunction with the Denver Urban Renewal Authority, or DURA), the 350,000 square
foot Denver Dry Goods project converted a single-use department store into a thriving
44 Gary Hack, "Updating Prudential Center," Urban Land October 1993, pp. 28-31.
mixed-use project. For five years, the historic brick building stood vacant and was
considered useless; department stores would not even consider the building because
stand-alone retail was no longer considered viable. Mixed-use development was the
only concept that would work on the site, and after many developers failed, AHDC
succeeded in combining offices, residential units and retail within the building's historical
envelope.4 5
AHDC had to create a complex design and financing strategy to bring the project into
fruition. Initially, lenders and local businesses alike were skeptical that the deal would
go through and therefore declined to commit. As a result, AHDC created three
commercial condominium units, which effectively divided the project into smaller, more
manageable pieces. The Robert Waxman Camera Company, a local retailer, committed
to buying one of the condo units and successfully obtained financing. As a result of this
visible commitment to the project, national retail tenants followed. Once the retailers
had committed, lenders were willing to look at the low-income housing component.
The condo structure allowed AHDC and DURA to accomplish many things. First, it
divided the risk into smaller pieces, so the project could gradually garner full financial
support. Second, it allowed AHDC to attract the appropriate owners for each unit, so
that each owner received the appropriate return on its component. According to Chuck
Perry at Perry/AHDC, the Waxman unit would have only worked with an owner-
operator; the housing would have only worked with a non-profit owner; and the
national retail would have only worked under for-profit ownership. Third, the condo
units gave the project future flexibility. The building still has a fourth unit, which
consists of four partial floors of the building. Since the vacant unit is legally separate,
AHDC has the flexibility to respond to the market with the most viable use, and to
attract the right ownership. Fourth, the condo structure allows the building to be
simultaneously treated as a whole and as a kit of parts. This is appropriate particularly
because the various users of the building have very different needs. The benefits of
mixing uses are kept intact, while the complications are minimized.
Interviews with developers and lenders indicated that the commercial condominium
approach has become more and more common. Many existing projects are looking to
condominiumization as a means of adding flexibility to already successful projects.
45 All information on the Denver Dry Goods Building was gathered from employees of AHDC
(see interview list).
CONCLUSION
This thesis examines the extent to which production and financing interact to implement
innovative development products--specifically mixed-use developments. In Chapter
Two, the basic underlying fundamentals of mixed-use development were identified, and
in Chapter Three, actual case studies were presented against a theoretical backdrop.
Indeed, from an evolutionary viewpoint, developers and lenders have increasingly made
good use of MXDs' unique attributes to facilitate the development process. As originally
stated, though synergy is still not recognized as having a measurable impact on the
economic performance of a project, it does have observable effects on long term market
image. Given the number of possible determinants behind economic performance--
location, exogenous market conditions, local competition, timing, etc.--it is
understandable that the industry has not pinpointed synergy as the sole key factor
behind MXD success. However, as the analysis of real estate information becomes
widely accessible, the perception may shift in favor of synergy, particularly in regards
to the Mouchly/Peiser theory of long term appreciation.
As noted in Chapter Three, the diversification effect held little importance in 1971 when
Water Tower Place was being financed. Yet today, lenders are fully cognizant of the
specific advantages of mixing uses on one site. As with synergy, this effect will most
likely be increasingly recognized as information is further disseminated. Eventually, as
hypothesized by Childs, Riddiough and Triantis, mixed-use developments may benefit
from lower default premia. Development risk has presented and will continue to
present very tough issues for developers of mixed-use developments. However, the
introduction of new instruments in the capital markets may alleviate some of these risks,
since capital will be more accessible for large-scale projects. Finally, as existing
mixed-use developments across the nation mature, there may be increased incidence of
physical conversion. As evidenced by the Prudential Center, the flexibility afforded by
careful design and planning can add direct value to a project.
Regardless of how the economic climate fluctuates in the future or when the next
generation of financial vehicles emerges, developers of mixed-use will need to focus on
flexibility. Only through innovative design, long-term financial structures that carefully
disperse risk, and legal provisions that create ongoing flexibility, will developers be able
to create projects that have all the benefits of physical bundling and still enjoy the
independence of separate entities. If developers can achieve both, they are maximizing
the advantages of mixed-use development and minimizing its shortcomings.
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APPENDIX
PROJECT TEAMS
Water Tower Place
Chicago, IL
Developer: Urban Investment and Development Co. and
Marshall Field & Company
Architects: Loebl, Schlossman & Hackl, Chicago
Murphy/Jahn Associates, Chicago
Consulting
Architect:
General
Contractor:
Copley Place
Boston, MA
Warren Platner Associates, New Haven
Inland Construction, Inc., Chicago
Developer: Urban Investment and Development Co.
Architects: The Architects Collaborative, Inc., Cambridge
The Stubbins Associates, Inc., Cambridge
Vitols Associates, Boston
Zaldastani Associates, Inc., Boston
Landscape
Architect: The Architects Collaborative, Inc.
General
Contractors: Perini Corporation, Boston
Turner Construction Company, Boston
900 North Michigan
Chicago, IL
Developer:
Associated
Architects:
General
Contractors:
Construction
Manager:
JMB/Urban Development Co.
Perkins & Will and Kohn Pedersen Fox Associates
(Chicago and New York)
J.A. Jones Construction Co.
Walsh Construction Company of Illinois
Inland Construction Company, Chicago
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